A Theory of Metaethical Prescriptivism

Abstract: In the philosophical literature and in standard dictionaries, there is a general distinction between 'descriptions' and 'prescriptions.' In this essay, I precisely define these concepts. 'Descriptions' are assertions that are literally true or false, and 'prescriptions' are assertions intended to be agreed-upon (but not literally true or false). Metaethical prescriptivism maintains that all normative ethical assertions and value affirmations are prescriptions. The name 'prescriptivism' is not to be associated with Hare's (1963) theory. Prescriptivism is a new non-cognitive anti-realist theory that challenges moral realism and non-cognitive expressivism.

Introduction

The debate about whether ethical assertions (i.e. normative 'ought' assertions) can be knowable continues into the 21st century. Moral realists maintain that there are objective moral truths independent of what anyone believes. In opposition, anti-realists claim that moral assertions are incapable of truth or falsity. The 'non-cognitivist' anti-realist theory here makes the claim that moral assertions are neither true nor false; and thus, they are not knowable. I argue that ethical assertions function to prescribe and not describe. The distinction between a 'description' and 'prescription' is hypothesized here:

A 'description' is an assertion that purports to express a correspondence (or a reflection) of some state of affairs, where its correctness (or incorrectness) is independent of its acceptance (or non-acceptance) by particular persons.

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1 Moral realists hold that morality is a search for the truth about what is right, and where our obligations are. Richard Boyd (1988) contends that: 1) Moral assertions are true or false, 2) The truth or falsity of moral assertions is independent of human opinion, and 3) Ordinary canons of consistent reasoning constitute a reliable method for obtaining moral knowledge.
A 'prescription' is an assertion that purports to express a stipulation (or rule) upon a practice, where its correctness (or incorrectness) is dependent upon its acceptance (or non-acceptance) by particular persons.

As will be explained below, the descriptive-prescriptive distinction presumes a 'speaker theory' of reference. With a theory of speaker reference (or 'speaker meaning'), a sentence (or proposition) is assumed to be the primitive linguistic entity where its contextual use is studied.

**Part I** of this essay is an exposition of 'prescriptivism.' After prescriptivism is defined, its associated assumptions about (1) ontology, (2) value, (3) speaker semantics, and (4) the structure of moral argument are described. **Part II** presents an analysis of the concept of 'proposition.' It is standardly believed that propositions are essentially true or false and the objects of 'propositional attitudes.' Both of these beliefs are challenged, and it is shown using case examples, that there exist 'prescriptive propositions' (i.e. non truth-apt) and that 'propositional attitudes' are a fiction. Persons do not have 'attitudes' toward propositions.

**Part III** challenges the belief that 'moral properties' exist. **Part IV** explains why 'cultural relativism' is false. **Part V** examines a moral dilemma (viz. 'should Jill cheat on her philosophy test?') and discusses the concept of 'goodness.'

**Part VI** responds to Mark Schroeder's (2008, 2010) demand that all non-cognitivist theories should conform to current theories in 'formal semantics' about sentence meaning. With formal semantics, it is taken for granted that words, phrases, and well-formed sentences possess meaning (in context) and that their systematic composition makes them meaningful. Both realist and expressivist theories attempt to explain the 'truth' of a sentence in terms of the systematic compositionality of the meaning of its parts (i.e. its words, syntactic structure). In opposition,
the explanatory relevance of 'linguistic theories' about 'semantic meaning,' and the 'principle of compositionality' are challenged. Instead a 'speaker theory' of reference is assumed.

A 'speaker theory' of reference and meaning (elaborated upon elsewhere) challenges formal theories of semantics where it is assumed that it is the composition of meaningful linguistic entities (and their referents) that make a sentence 'meaningful.' Instead with a speaker theory of reference, a speaker's referent, on occasion of use, is dependent upon the speaker's intentions. It is persons who use linguistic expressions to refer to various objects (or entities) and 'mean something' in a context. It is persons who intend that their assertion is 'truth-apt' or not. Words, phrases, and sentences (linguistic entities) don't literally refer (in natural language).

Part VII resolves the Frege-Geach problem. Part VIII briefly compares expressivism to prescriptivism and states why prescriptivism is a better explanation of the nature of moral assertions. Expressivism is a theory of linguistic meaning and formal semantics, where it is thought that the normative words like 'ought' and 'wrong' function to express 'non-cognitive attitudes.' Ethical assertions function to express states of mind; not represent facts. Expressivists believe that the meaning and function of words in moral language differ from representational descriptions. As stated, semantic theories about the 'meaning' of ethical assertions are misguided.

This essay may seem to some readers as disjointed and meandering. But, 'metaethical theories' are influenced by 'theories of language,' which are influenced by 'metaphysics' and 'logic.' The conceptual analyses presented here, just require some sudden shifts of concern.

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7 With a 'speaker theory' of reference, a well-formed sentence is the basic unit of meaning, not the words that compose it. Sentences (and propositions) are the primary meaningful constituents of a language, and their meaningfulness is not completely attributable to compositional structure.
Part I. Metaethical Prescriptivism: Ethical Assertions are Prescriptions

I introduce metaethical prescriptivism:

**Prescriptivism:** Ethical assertions and substantive value affirmations are prescriptions. The 'correctness' of any ethical assertion (or value affirmation) is dependent upon what persons accept, tolerate, or agree-to, and does not refer to an objective moral reality. Ethical assertions are intended to direct, or affect, human action. They stipulate a form of practice as an intentional, purposeful activity. Examples of ethical assertions include 'you should place your fork on the left-hand side of the plate' and 'abortion should (or should not) be legal.' Metaethical prescriptivism maintains that ethical propositions may be accepted (or adopted) by persons, but that they are neither true nor false. The pertinent question: Is prescriptivism true or false? The evidence for believing prescriptivism is true is consistent with the following:

1) **Ontology:** A belief-desire-value-intention ontology regarding human behavior is assumed in a materialist philosophy of mind. A 'belief' is understood as a functional mental state involving affirming, doubting, or suspending judgment about a propositional assertion. Beliefs function to represent the world (and assert something objective that is true independent of its acceptance by persons). Contrary to moral realism, there are no 'moral beliefs' because moral assertions are not beliefs (i.e. moral propositions don't represent the world). Moral assertions are not truth-apt, so they are not beliefs. There are no independent metaphysical 'moral facts.'

Against varieties of moral realism, it is assumed that the fundamental existent is physical entities (not objects). Mental states are best described in naturalist-like material terms. A 'desire' is a functional brain state that is a primitive psychological, emotional, or hormonal state that motivates many of our actions. Beliefs and desires lead us to action. A 'value' is a functional
physical brain state that measures the worth or importance of certain physical objects, events or actions. Assertions of value are the product of a person's desires, feelings, interests, beliefs, and other values in a social environment. An 'intention to act' is a determination to behave in a certain way. An 'action' is defined as behaviors that are under our control or could be, if we gave them enough thought. Not only do intentions (as functional brain states) manifest themselves in actions; the 'intention to communicate' using language (i.e. to express one's thoughts) which may be termed a 'speech act.' In various contexts, persons assert (i.e. express, utter, communicate) thoughts (i.e. well-formed sentences) that are intended to be either descriptive or prescriptive.

2) The Subjectivity of Value: According to non-cognitivists, claims about 'what is valuable' are subjective and dependent upon human. This responds to the question, 'Do acts and objects have value independent of them being desired, or are actions and objects valuable because we desire them?' Non-cognitivists believe that the second response is true.

The conflict between cognitivists and non-cognitivists is characterized by opposing beliefs about the alleged 'objectivity' or 'subjectivity' of value:

(a) **Value is objective (secularism).** According to many secular moral cognitivists, value has a real nature and existence that is independent of humans. Moral value is independent of our psychology and of our likes, dislikes, interests, and desires.

(b) **Value is objective (theism).** According to many theists, there exists a supernatural entity $x$ knowing of all things (including moral duties) whose ethics should be followed.

(c) **Value is subjective (secularism).** According to secular non-cognitivists, value owes its existence to the interests, desires, and attitudes of humans (and other sentient creatures). Without sentient creatures, there would be no desires, no values, and no
assertions about what is good. The attribution of value isn't about the existence of an external element of reality. For the protection and well-being of the species, persons have developed rules (i.e. principles) of what are right and wrong actions, based upon the weighing of various values. Values can be changed or adjusted on the basis of new information, or with sensitivity to value conflicts or differences in value. Values evolve.

David Hume (1740) famously challenged the 'objectivity' of value in *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Hume argued that even in a case of premeditated cold-blooded murder, there is no objective wrongness to such an act, but instead the act is morally wrong because it violates our *shared sentiments* (*i.e.* feelings, emotions, values) of what is good and bad. The prohibition against the killing of innocent persons is the result of moral sentiments including empathy, compassion, and guilt. Ethical assertions are not the perception (or misperception) of a moral truth, but instead express and codify ethical standards (see Nidditch, ed. 1978, pp. 468-469). Hume's fundamental intuition about the subjective core of morality seems to be true.

Hume's 'belief-desire theory' of moral motivation is also accepted here. Moral motivation involves the presence of beliefs and desires. On this theory of moral motivation, values are adopted (or condemned) for non-random subjective reasons, reflecting desired ways of life. A desire to participate and perpetuate life within civil societies seems to motivate the adoption of basic values. Widely held values (e.g. being respectful of people, keeping promises, telling the truth, not stealing, etc.) function to resolve conflicts of interests, develop positive character, promote happiness, and enable society to survive. A person cannot function without values, any more than without beliefs. Individual praise and social rewards lead to the pursuit of socially desired conducts. Feelings of guilt, a fear of social rebuke, and legal penalties constrain our
actions. Having (good) standards of value doesn't always motivate consistent actions; lapses in self-prescribed morality happen. Sometimes a person's 'weakness' of will, in combination with countervailing motivations and emotions may lead to an ethical lapse (or 'moral mistake').

Although desires are the primary motivator of intentional action, we do not always act upon brute desires (e.g. greed, infatuation) because we are 'informed' that some actions may have adverse consequences (to oneself and others). We often pursue desires based on information and self-restraint, which are called 'informed desires.' Let us illustrate an 'informed' desire.

Sally desires inexpensive clothing. But, suppose that Sally also deplores low wage sweatshop working conditions. If Sally learns that a certain brand of inexpensive clothing employs sweatshop conditions, Sally may no longer desire (or value, or intend) the purchase of that clothing item, even if it is inexpensive. Sally adopts a value hierarchy that prefers 'boycotting sweatshop items' over 'purchasing inexpensive clothing.'

This simple ontology of beliefs, desires, values, and intentions can explain most of our actions. A moral judgment is a complex mental state exemplifying these four functional states.

Not all ethical disagreements involve a disagreement in basic value. A basic value may be generally agreed-upon, but certain pragmatic issues come into play. For example, a community can agree that childhood education is good, but may disagree on what actions should be undertaken to achieve this outcome on a cost-effective basis. 'Should a new school be built, and if so, at what expense should it be built, and where should it be built?' John Dewey (1939) contends that assertions of what is 'right' or 'good' occur with changing circumstances, involving persons with distinct interests and conceptions of what is good.
3) The Speaker Semantics of Moral Assertion: According to metaethical prescriptivism, ethical assertions are prescriptions, even if they are falsely believed to be descriptions by a moral cognitivist. Moral assertions do not function to 'represent reality' as do beliefs, but instead they function to represent choice and guide action. Ethical assertions can be agreed-on, adopted, or accepted by persons having shared values. With prescriptions, a social consensus is typically sought, and not the discovery of ethical truth.

According to a prescriptivist, an ordinary assertion such as ‘I believe that S should do a,’ where a designates an action, is not a statement of belief at all. Instead, it is a prescription. It is more accurate to say that ‘I prescribe that S should do a.’ Moral cognitivists talk strongly of values and ethical assertions as being ‘beliefs.’ But non-cognitivists don’t believe that ethical assertions are beliefs, because ‘beliefs’ are either true or false. It is more accurate to say that values can be adopted and endorsed, and that ethical behavior is prescribed. 2

Another salient feature of moral assertions is that sincere assertions are universalizable and categorical as contrasted to merely stating one’s personal preference, taste, or ideal. This aspect of morality was strongly emphasized by R.M. Hare (1952, 1963, 1981). Persons have specific reasons (i.e. facts and values) for having a categorical commitment for why an action should be done. Sincerely held ethical assertions express a commitment to uphold one’s adopted

2 This interpretation is at odds with moral realism. Russ Shafer-Landau (2003) applauds realism because it "preserves ordinary talk of moral truth." He says when we face a moral perplexity, "we often see ourselves as engaged in a search for the truth about who is in the right, or where our obligations lie. We can well explain the point and persistence of moral disagreement by attributing to agents the presupposition that there is a right answer awaiting discovery" (p. 23).
stance against conflicting stances. In other words, the same policy or principle applies in similar situations as a matter of consistency. This sincere commitment (or desire) to uphold one's own values consistently is compatible with Hume's belief-desire theory of moral motivation.

4) The Structure of Moral Argument: Hume’s claim that an ethical ‘ought’ conclusion cannot be inferred solely from a set of descriptive ‘is’ premises is true. On the prescriptivist view, any argument with an ethical ‘ought’ conclusion is necessarily derived from a set of premises which includes at least one prescriptive (ought) assertion.

Let us observe how descriptions and prescriptions function in practical ethical reasoning. We will consider the enhanced ban on intoxicated driving. Beginning in 1980, a grassroots group called Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) launched a campaign to curb tolerance for alcohol-impaired driving in the United States. In the following example, suppose that Smith has been drinking and driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.32 (i.e. a high level of alcohol intoxication). How does this fact lead to the conclusion that 'Smith should be subject to legal penalty'? Below is how a prescriptivist identifies ‘descriptions’ and ‘prescriptions’ in this case:

(#1) **Description:** Driver intoxication often causes auto accidents.

(#2) **Prescription (value):** Auto accidents have negative value.

(#3) **Prescription (ethical principle):** Drivers shouldn’t be intoxicated.

(#4) **Prescription (ethical principle):** Intoxicated drivers should be subject to stricter enforcement and higher legal penalty for violation (the MADD principle).

(#5) **Description:** Smith was driving with a high blood-alcohol content of .32.

(#6) **Prescription:** Therefore, Smith should be subject to strict legal penalties.
The above argument illustrates how a prescriptive ethical conclusion #6 is the result of several prescriptive (ought) premises. Premises #2, #3, and #4 are prescriptions and depend upon human agreement of what ought to be valued. In contrast, premises #1 and #5 are descriptions and are true (or false) independent of human agreement.

We can shorten the above ethical argument into a deductive form as follows:

1) **Prescription (ethical principle):** If S drives impaired, S should be subject to penalty.

2) **Description:** Smith drove impaired.

3) **Prescription (ethical conclusion):** Therefore, Smith should be penalized.

Although this short argument has a valid *modus ponens* form, such that if all of the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true; it should be recognized that the argument is not sound, since the first premise is not literally true. In logic, it is stipulated that an argument is ‘sound’ if and only if its premises are true, and its form is valid. Given the definition of a prescription (that it is neither true nor false) it is impossible to ever generate a sound ethical argument, given the standard definition of what constitutes a sound deductive argument.

With a moral argument, the best we can do is to present a valid argument, where it is assumed (as a fiction) that the value and ethical premises have a truth value, and that the validity of the argument is determined by the standard rules of deductive logic. The assumption that ethical values and principles are 'true or false' is false, but there is no harm in assessing the validity of arguments, if it is understood that the value premises don't literally have a truth value.

**Part II. Speaker Meaning: What is a Proposition? Are there Prescriptive Propositions?**

What is a proposition? For Scott Soames (2015) 'propositions' are the "(i) the primary bearers of truth and falsity, (ii) the objects of belief, assertion, and other attitudes, (iii) the
contents of perceptual and cognitive states, and (iv) the meanings of (some) sentences" (p. 9). This is a widely accepted definition, similar to the definition reported in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy and is oftentimes a starting point for metaphysical analyses.

Below, I will challenge this definition and suggest another. I will argue against the first two conditions, namely (i) that necessarily propositions are either true or false, and (ii) that propositions are the objects of attitudes. The first condition just asserts by simple stipulation that there is no such thing as a 'prescriptive proposition.' The second condition makes an indefensible metaphysical claim that person have 'attitudes' towards propositions. This relationship is very dubious. Non-cognitive theories often deny that ethical sentences express 'propositions' (because they are essentially true or false) while the prescriptivist theory suggested here maintains that ethical sentences do express 'propositions,' since there exist 'prescriptive propositions.'

In its most neutral characterization, a 'proposition' is a complete sentence asserted in a context that presents the contents of one's thought. Let us examine the following conceptual case studies to defend this simple definition:

(1) The sentence 'It is now raining' (as a linguistic expression) is not by itself literally true or false. The sentence needs to be asserted in an environment and at a certain time to be true or false. It is the proposition expressed (in a context) by the sentence 'It is now raining' that is true when it is raining, and false when it is not raining. Sentences are not literally true or false, but it is their assertion as a 'proposition' in a context that is either true or false.

(2) The English sentence 'Snow is white' expresses the same proposition as the German sentence 'Der Schnee ist weis.' Given that these sentences are different, it isn't the
linguistic entities (i.e. sentences of different language) that make the assertions true, it is the proposition (i.e. meaningful content) that is true.

(3) The sentences 'Here is the red book' and the 'The red book is here' when asserted in a context to a single book express the same proposition. It is not the sentences (which differ in syntax) that is literally true or false, it is the proposition expressed by a sentence that is true or false.

(4) 'Sam is mad' and 'Sam is angry' are different sentences. 'Mad' and 'angry' are synonyms, so either sentence may be used in a context. The proposition is true or false (about Sam) no matter which sentence is used.

(5) The sentence 'My name is George' when asserted by different persons, may be true, even though the same sentence is used to express different propositions.

(6) The sentences 'Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn' and 'Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn' are different sentences but express the same true proposition, because Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens. It isn't the sentences that are true, it is the same proposition (expressed by different sentences) that is true.  

(7) The sentences that 'today was fun' and 'yesterday was fun' when stated on consecutive days, are used to express the same proposition.

8 Another interpretation is that these sentences don't express the same proposition. Whether these sentences express the same propositional content rests upon a person's background knowledge. If S doesn't know that the proper names, 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' designate the same person (and are synonyms), these sentences express two propositions (e.g. one proposition might be deemed true, the other false). For this S, these sentences express different propositions.
(8) The sentence 'The present King of France is bald' expressed two different propositions when asserted (or used) during two consecutive time periods when Louis XIV and Louis XV continuously ruled.

(9) The proposition 'I am pale' is true or false, contingent upon the physical appearance of a person asserting the sentence. The proposition stated may be true or false depending on whom asserts the sentence.

(10) The sentence 'Persons should not smoke tobacco' is understood by a metaethical cognitivist as a true or false proposition. For a non-cognitivist, this can be interpreted as a prescriptive proposition (not truth-apt).

The basic idea behind these examples is that sentences in natural language (i.e. linguistic entities) are not true or false, but it is the proposition expressed that is apt for truth or falsity (or not apt for truth or falsity). I define a 'proposition' as a sentence that when asserted at a time and in a context, presents the content of one's thought, with 'content' (or 'significance,' 'meaning') being primitive (undefined) terms. Descriptive and prescriptive propositions, asserted in context, normally have content, significance, or meaning for a speaker. This definition of 'proposition' will be resisted by metaphysicians and moral realists who maintain all declarative sentences, statements, assertions, and propositions are either true or false, and some necessarily so.9

9 Metaphysicians seek to provide an account about the 'nature' of propositions. Jeffery C. King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks, in their New Thinking About Propositions (2014) admit that with their (competing) individual theories of 'proposition,' that they are not committed to an account of propositions that respects commonsense or folk intuitions (p. 2). The concept of 'proposition' is deemed a technical semantic notion that only professional philosophers may understand.
Core Intuitions About Propositions and Sentences.

The ten case studies and the proposed definition of 'proposition' are consistent with some of the widely accepted philosophical core intuitions about what a proposition is: (1) A proposition is a complete declarative sentence asserted in a context that presents the 'content' of S's thought. Propositions exist as the 'shared content' of sentences. A proposition is the 'content' or 'meaning' of a declarative sentence. (2) A proposition is (metaphorically) 'what is said' by a declarative sentence. (3) Different sentences may be used to express the same proposition (relative to context). In other words, 'different sentences' relative to context can state 'the same thing' or have 'the same meaning.' (4) Sentences (and their corresponding descriptive propositions) are true or false relative to context.

The case studies show, from linguistic (and worldview) intuitions, that contrary to the popular metaphysical belief, propositions are not essentially true or false. Below I show that contrary to popular metaphysical belief, propositions are not the 'objects' of 'attitudes.'

Are Propositions the Objects of Propositional Attitudes?

A belief held among many philosophers is that persons have 'propositional attitudes' (i.e. psychological-mental attitude states) towards propositions. 'Propositional attitudes' account for a person's psychological state towards a proposition:

(1) S believes that p. S disbelieves that p.
(2) S assumes that p. S doubts that p.
(3) S desires (or wishes) that p. S dislikes (or has aversion) that p.
(4) S hopes that p. S fears that p.
With propositional attitude reports, 'propositions' are defined as referents of *that*-clauses. A proposition is whatever the that-clause refers to or denotes. The proposition p is understood as the 'content' of a belief, desire, value, and so on, and the 'referent' of S's attitude.

Let "Human-generated warming of the planet is presently occurring," and "Abortion should be legal (with certain restrictions)" be the proposition p in the above sentences. These sentences illustrate the relationship between persons, propositions, and so-called propositional attitudes. The above 'attitude ascriptions' using attitude verbs, *report* what S believes, desires, values, etc. as a *relation* of S to those two propositions.\(^\text{10}\)

Do persons have an 'attitude' towards 'global warming is real' and 'abortion should be legal' where p is a (possible) state of affairs? The critical response argued here is that persons do not have *relations* (or *attitudes*) toward propositions as 'objects' of belief, desire, value, etc. Beliefs, values, and other attitude verbs aren't about 'something.' Propositions are not the objects of attitudes. The mistaken talk about 'propositional attitudes' emanates from the non-scientific language of metaphysics. Instead, it is more plausible and physically consistent with empirical evidence, that persons *believe p* or *value p* as existing non-relational functional mental states.

**Part III: The Metaphysics of Moral Realism: Are there Moral Properties?**

Let us critically study the concepts of 'propositional attitude,' 'property,' and 'relation' with two case studies describing a metaphysician's interpretation of natural language sentences:

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\(^{10}\) David Shier (2012) states that 'propositional attitude reports' (i.e. sentences reporting the propositional attitudes of individuals) are "central to our psychological discourse and to our understanding of the world, since in order to explain and predict behavior, we must appeal to information about the beliefs, desires, etc. of ourselves and others" (p. 795).
(1) Case Study: 'Snow is white.'

Metaphysician: To say that Simon believes that snow is white (and assert the sentence 'snow is white') is to say that Simon is related by belief to the propositional attitude that snow is white. In other words, Simon has an affirmative propositional attitude that snow is white.

Response: To say that Simon believes that snow is white (and assert the sentence 'snow is white') is to say that Simon possesses a functional mental state that affirms that snow is white. In other words, Simon possesses a (non-relational) belief state that affirms (as opposed to doubt, suspending judgment) that snow is white. For Simon to say that 'snow is white' is for Simon to assert a non-relational state of belief. Simon has no relation to a 'propositional attitude.'

As stated above, a belief-desire-value-intention ontology is assumed with a materialist philosophy of mind. A belief is a non-relational functional mental state involving affirming, doubting, or suspending judgment about a propositional assertion. Beliefs function to represent the world. A value is a non-relational functional physical brain state that measures the worth or importance of certain physical objects, events or actions. The metaphysician's schema designed for the measurement of what a proposition is, to identify a 'propostion' as an independent entity about what attitudes are about is fallacious. There is no binary relationship from S (with belief or value) to an abstract 'proposition'. The physical existence of personal functional material mental states (e.g. beliefs, values) may (or may not) be empirically verifiable, but this physicalist explanation is more plausible than the metaphysical one.

The Problem of Universals

Besides the postulation of 'propositional attitudes' as an abstract explanatory device, moral realists often adopt a terminology about universals, particulars, properties, relations,
concrete objects, and abstract objects. The basic metaphysical axioms adopted are the following: (1) entities are either 'universal' or 'particular.' (2) universals are either 'properties' or 'relations.' (3) objects are either 'concrete' or 'abstract.' Whether any of these theoretical entities exist (or not) is among the oldest problems of metaphysics. This is called 'the problem of universals.' The basic question is whether besides individual entities, are there other things that are properties of individuals, and if there are, where are they, and how do they relate to the individuals that have them. Semantic theories about natural language are heavily influenced by metaphysics.

Simplifying a bit, and repeating from above, the ontology and axiomatization of a traditional hierarchal *a priori* metaphysics is as follows: (1) Entities exist (assumes a non-empty universe), (2) All entities are either ‘universal’ or ‘particular,’ (3) Universals can be divided into ‘properties’ or ‘relations.’ (4) Particulars can be divided into ‘objects’ or ‘tropes.’ Objects can be divided into ‘concrete objects’ or ‘abstract objects.’ Examples of ‘concrete objects’ include atoms, people, buildings, goats, planets, stamps, and so on. ‘Abstract objects’ are defined as objects that do not exist in space or time and are therefore entirely non-physical and non-mental. Propositions, propositional attitudes, properties, relations, events, as well as mathematical objects such as a set, numbers, and geometrical figures are examples of *abstract objects*.

(2) Case Study: 'The computer screen is rectangular.'

**Metaphysician:** To say that Simon believes that the computer screen is rectangular and then for him to assert the sentence 'the computer screen is rectangular' is to say that the computer screen has the *property* of being rectangular.

**Response:** To say that Simon believes that the computer screen is rectangular (and assert the sentence 'the computer screen is rectangular') is to say that S *possesses a functional mental
state that affirms that the perceived computer screen is rectangular. In other words, Simon possesses a (non-relational) belief state that affirms (as opposed to doubt, suspending judgment) that the computer screen is rectangular.

When a person attributes the predicates of 'rectangular,' 'honest,' 'tall,' 'white,' to particular entities this is not done by imagining that they are attributing some universal properties (rectangularity, honesty, tallness, whiteness) to particulars. This is the worldview of metaphysicians. Talk of 'properties' may be informative in some cases and domains (e.g. mathematics, formal semantics, physical science, and some ordinary talk) but talk of properties is often epistemically misleading in other contexts. (e.g. ethics, metaphysics, and aesthetics).

Are There Moral Properties?

Moral realists often talk about 'moral predicates' that refer to 'moral properties.' Most realists have an account of moral properties. What are 'moral properties' and how do they fit into the realist account? A standard description of moral realism from Andrew Fischer (2014, p. 5):

**Moral realism:** This is about what exists (ontology). The moral realist argues that moral properties exist and are in some way independent from people's judgments. E.g. If moral realism is correct then we can say that the act of killing someone has the property of wrongness, and that it has it independently of whether people think it does.

Michael Huemer (2005, p. 17) states that 'pleasure is good' asserts a *proposition*…

…which can be either true or false, just like the statements 'The sky is red' and "Weasels are mammals' does. Given this, the most straightforward account of what the word 'good' is doing in the sentence is this: there is a property, *goodness*, which the word refers to, and the sentence ascribes that property to pleasure.
Are there moral properties? If $x$ is good, does $x$ possess the property of goodness? If $S$ is honest, does $S$ possess the property of honesty? Or is it a better explanation of these value judgments, that it is persons who 'attribute' (or predicate, evaluate) goodness and honesty to items as a matter of (positive) similarity. Intuitively, it seems a better explanation that persons are asserting 'relations of similarity' among items as dictated by our interests, evaluations, and shared concepts (as a group resemblance), rather than properties as objectively 'residing in' particular entities. That a moral realist postulates the 'existence' of 'moral properties' (e.g. goodness) as an ontological and epistemic basis for moral knowledge is very questionable.

**Part IV. The Falsity of Cultural Relativism**

Cultural relativism is a doctrine about the nature of morality. Cultural relativism follows from the empirical recognition that different societies have different moral codes. The modern impetus for the support of philosophical cultural relativism arose in the late 19th century with the Western study of cultural anthropology. Anthropologists were fascinated with a diversity of non-Western cultures, including the Eskimos. An influential scholar was Edward Westermarck (1862-1939). He was a social scientist who wrote anthropological and philosophical works, defending forms of cultural relativism. In 1947, when the United Nations was debating "human rights," the American Anthropological Association issued a controversial statement declaring that moral values are relative to cultures and that there is no way of showing that the values of one culture are better than those of another. What exactly is the doctrine of metaethical cultural relativism? The following is a standard definition (among several existing variations):

**Metaethical Cultural Relativism (MCR):** The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification is neither absolute nor universal, but is relative to the traditions,
convictions, or practices of a group of persons. With respect to truth-value, this implies that a moral judgment such as 'Polygamy is morally wrong' may be true relative to one society, but false relative to another. The standards of justification in the two societies may differ, but there is no objective basis for resolving these differences. For any moral sentence and the sentence's negation, it is possible for both to be asserted truly. A proposition about the morality of an action is 'correct' for (or relative to) a society just in case the action conforms to a society's moral code or system of beliefs about morality.

A moral relativist, Gilbert Harman (1996) (not his precise definition above) states that "There are many different moral frameworks, none of which is more correct than the others" (p. 5).

The prescriptivist does not accept cultural relativism as a true description of morality. Prescriptivism doesn't imply that the 'correctness' of an ethical assertion depends upon cultural moral frameworks and that assertions of ethical rightness just means that a certain action has cultural approval. Nor does it imply that any moral framework is 'equally as good' as any other. Instead, prescriptivism allows that there are moral frameworks (e.g. a system of laws, agreements) that can be prescribed as being better than others. For instance, it may be prescribed that 'forced female circumcision is wrong,' or 'human slavery is wrong' in all societies.

The concise (and true) reason why metaethical cultural relativism (MCR) is false, is that if the meaning (and truth) of ethical assertions was about their correctness 'relative to a culture,' this would indicate that persons would be only be saying something (purportedly true) about the existing practices and codes of a culture. Persons would not be adopting a position on the substantive correctness of a practice. This problem has been long recognized by critics of moral
relativism. Harman's theory of non-objective 'cultural agreements' as the source of ethical
normativity and variability, doesn't capture the prescriptive intent behind the bargaining.

**What 'Prescriptivism' Is Not**

Prescriptivism should not be associated with cultural relativism, conventionalism,
anarchy, tolerance, or nihilism. Prescriptivism is a descriptive theory. No normative claims can
be inferred from a descriptive theory. Let us rebut these various claims:

1) Prescriptivism does not make the normative claim that any conduct that is accepted
(or tolerated) at a given time by a culture is morally permissible for that given time and
culture. An ethical proposition isn't 'correct' relative to societal agreements.

2) Prescriptivism does not imply 'conventionalism,' a normative theory that you should
always act in conformity with your society's norms.

3) Prescriptivism does not imply that persons should just arbitrarily pick their own value
system, and merely follow their own interests, inclinations, and impulses without
consideration of others. It doesn't endorse anarchy.

4) Prescriptivism doesn't imply that we should be tolerant of existing (or new) practices.

5) Prescriptivism does not imply moral nihilism (i.e. values are senseless and useless and
should be abandoned). A person's normative character is based upon non-objective values
and principles that he or she adopts and faithfully practices.

**Part V. A Moral Question: Identifying Descriptions and Prescriptions**

That prescriptivism is morally neutral when describing normative situations needs
illustration. For example, it makes no judgment about whether Jill should (or should not) cheat
on her philosophy test. This case is from Louis Pojman (1995):
Jill is presently getting a D in her philosophy course and sees an opportunity to raise her grade by cheating on an exam. She would like to get a better grade, for if she doesn't do better, her father will very likely take away her automobile, and her chances of getting into professional school will be severely diminished. So, Jill considers cheating. Yet she is troubled by the thought of cheating. Ought she to cheat? (p. 187).

How do desires, values, beliefs, and intentions fit into this story? Where are the descriptions and prescriptions? Let's follow the premises and outcomes in the reasoning of Jill's self-deliberation:

(#1) Prescription (value, principle): Jill accepts that in general, 'it is wrong to cheat.'

(#2) Prescription (desire, value): Jill desires getting into professional school, maintaining possession of her automobile, and getting a B on her test.

(#3) Descriptions: Jill wants to get a B test grade to raise her grade from D to C (true). Jill doesn't have time to study for this morning's test (true). Jill can achieve a B by cheating (either true or false). Jill will not get caught or punished (either true or false).

(#4) Prescription: Therefore, Jill ought or ought-not cheat.

This case illustrates how a moral conclusion involves the personal weighing of (1) values, (2) desires, (3) beliefs, and (4) normative principles in cases of value conflict. There is (most often) a strong connection between a person's values and motivations to act, but at times, following one's own ethical principles is fallible. As Jill actively deliberates whether to cheat this time (or not), she might vow to herself, to study harder and earlier in the future to avoid this predicament.

In this situation, under ordinary standards of morality and integrity, most of us would want Jill to embrace value premise in #1 as a more important compared to her present desires and values in #2. We urge her to adopt the second option of the ethical decision in #4. Among
our reasons for urging Jill not to cheat: (a) if everyone cheated the institution of testing would be
disabled, (b) one should respect a test as a means for learning and verifying one's understanding,
(c) cheating isn't fair to other students that don't cheat, and (d) she doesn't know that she will get
a B by cheating, nor that she won't be caught and punished. But, if Jill is indifferent to the
scholarship standards of others, and decides to risk cheating, there is no fact that make's Jill's
decision objectively wrong and no sound deductive argument proving Jill's action is wrong.

The Concept of Goodness

With the apparent popular contemporary (secular) Western opinion that affirms that
personal values are 'subjective' and 'relative,' it might be thought obvious that what is 'good' is
subjective and relative, and that prescriptivism is elaborating upon common sense. But this is
not the case. The widely favored philosophical view since the time of the early Greeks is that
value is objective. Moral realists have claimed that 'goodness' and 'value' are 'natural properties'
inherent in material objects, actions, experiences, and states of affairs, and that moral concepts
can be defined in non-moral terms. From ancient times, philosophers speculated on what human
values and actions are intrinsically good. The intrinsic goodness of something is thought to give
persons a reason, or moral motivation, to attain it. G.E. Moore (1903) sought to clarify the
notion of 'intrinsic goodness' as a 'non-natural' property. One of the most extensive lists of
'intrinsic goods' was collected by William Frankena (1973) and includes: life, activity, health,
happiness, contentment, knowledge, aesthetic experience, love, friendship, power and
experiences of achievement, self-expression, freedom, good reputation, honor, and esteem.

In contrast, from the perspective of a prescriptivist, Frankena's list is not a set of objective
intrinsic goods. It is a list of subjective species and personalized relative goods. The question
'what has intrinsic value' contrasts with our metaethical question, 'what is intrinsic value?' The non-cognitivist asks how could you determine whether an item or action has intrinsic value? What does it mean for an item or action to be 'valuable for its own sake' that is independent of our interests? The concepts of 'intrinsic goodness' and 'inherent value' are indefensible postulations. They invite the mistaken belief of the existence of objective goodness and value.

J.L. Mackie (1977) offers the following response to theories of objective value and goodness. According to Mackie, an item $x$ (e.g. action, physical item, state of affairs, policy, etc.) is valued, or is good, because we desire it, and not because it has intrinsically desirable properties. A good $x$ satisfies some set of wants, interests, or requirements. Whether something is morally good is relative to a set of values, moral standards, or point of view. Mackie asserts that attempts to define 'goodness' in terms of non-moral properties or identifying 'goodness' with intrinsic objective properties were mistaken. Instead, 'good' is used as an 'adjective' for an item that satisfies some subjective want or interest. For example, in one context a car can be described (or prescribed) as a 'good car' (e.g. for a small family), but the same car is not a 'good car' relative to the interests of a race car driver (e.g. if it doesn't go over 120 MPH). Harman (1996) observes that "whether something is morally good, right, or just, is always relative to a set of moral coordinates, a set of values or moral standards, a certain moral point of view" (p. 17).

**Summary: The Observational Evidence for Prescriptivism**

Moral realists maintain that morality is objective and independent of us. Is this consistent with the evidence of actual moral phenomena? On the contrary, *shared values* among persons seems to *better explain* a *moral consensus* than the *discovery* of objective values. Some value agreements are difficult to attain, and differences may seem intractable. Sometimes there are
conflicts in individuals' affective attitudes. 'Affective attitudes' are an emotional affection or repulsion towards an object or practice. Persons can have conflicting attitudes (e.g. the value of a fetus, use of recreational drugs, homosexual relations, and the proper treatment of animals) where a disagreement in value is basic. But with the political appeal to facts, values, consequences, and ethical arguments, changes in beliefs and changes in values can occur within a person and between generations (e.g. marijuana legalization, the legalization of same-sex marriage). Possessing true beliefs is crucial to having informed values. False beliefs and ignorance may lead to misinformed values and action that is harmful to one's self or others.

**Part VI. Schroeder's Defense of Moral Realism based upon Formal Semantic Constraints**

Mark Schroeder (2010), a proponent of realism, is concerned with problems with the semantics of non-cognitive sentences. Schroeder’s argument against expressivism (and non-cognitive theories) is that these theories do not follow the rules of truth-conditional semantics (p. 26). Truth-conditional theories of semantics seek to best represent how linguistic expressions in natural languages can possess meaning. For Schroeder, with an adequate model, one can learn about the meaning of 'linguistic expressions' and the correlations between ‘linguistic expressions’ and ‘meanings’ by investigating how the meaning of a complex expression (e.g. a sentence) is the result of the meaning of simpler expressions (e.g. words) that it is constructed from.

Schroeder's theory about sentence meaning claims that to understand the 'meaning' of a sentence is to understand the sentence's compositional structure and to know under what
conditions the sentence would be true.\textsuperscript{11} The goal of a truth-conditional semantic theory is to represent (or interpret) reality and natural languages in an explicit logical form, similar to how formal mathematical languages map (and evaluate) the validity of deductive arguments.

\textbf{The Principle of Compositionality}

A fundamental part of Schroeder's semantics is the adoption of the 'principle of compositionality.' Like most philosophers, he maintains 'compositionality' is \textit{required} for understanding how the meanings of complex sentences are put together. This principle asserts that words are the basic components of sentences, and that the meaning of sentences depends (systematically) on the meaning of the words that they are composed of. Schroeder's reasoning is that "This is because there are infinitely many sentences in any natural language, and if you understand the meaning of just a few words, we can construct arbitrarily many new sentences that you have never seen before… because you can figure out their meaning on the basis of their parts and how those parts are put together. This is usually called the \textit{compositional constraint}" (p. 27). The compositional constraint is from writings of logician Gottlob Frege (1879, 1892).

The 'compositional theory' of sentence meaning states that to represent the meaning of a sentence (in a precise logical structure) is to understand how its words contribute in a systematic way to the meaning of the sentence. It is assumed various \textit{forms} of \textit{linguistic expression} (e.g. proper names, predicates) have 'semantic functions' and may possess 'semantic values' that can

\textsuperscript{11} Using Schroeder's example, for the sentence 'Colorado is rectangular' to be true; the \textit{thing} \textit{Colorado} (i.e. physical entity) must be of a rectangular shape, where the proper name 'Colorado' is about the thing Colorado. We use this sentence to say that its truth conditions are satisfied. The 'reference' (or aboutness) of 'linguistic expressions' (the proper name, sentence) is assumed.
mean this or refer to that. Linguistic items (words, sentences) are said to be about, stand for, or represent something (a thing, or an object). In order to understand the meaning of a word is to know what the word is 'about.' Frege wanted to explain how certain linguistic forms contribute to a sentence's meaning, and ultimately its truth value. Semantics as now popularly practiced, utilizes formal models and consists of grammatical modeling and manipulation of linguistic entities in accordance with the standard rules of deductive logic.

Schroeder states a dominant view about 'sentence meaning,' 'truth,' and 'word aboutness':

…The ideas that the meaning of a sentence consists of what would make it true and that the meaning of a word consists in what the word is about, are powerful and productive ideas. As a hypothesis about meanings, they have led to an enormously productive and successful research program in both linguistics and philosophy, which has shed light on the meanings of a great variety of kinds of linguistic expressions… a very productive paradigm for understanding linguistic meaning (p. 29).

But are the theories of 'linguistic reference' and 'compositionality' empirically true? Do natural language sentences (asserted in context) have meaning because of their formal syntax and semantics? Is it true that one's understanding of the meaning of a sentence is knowing the sentence's compositional structure and knowing under what conditions the sentence would be true? Are linguistic entities (words, sentences, phrases) asserted in a context about something? Linguistic theories of reference postulate that there exists a 'reference relation' between 'words' and 'objects.' But I have argued elsewhere that this 'linguistic expression' to 'object' relation exists in artificial languages; but doesn't exist in natural languages. Instead of seeking systematic
theories of word reference, philosophers should seek to analyze the concepts and intentions in context(s) and describe how sentences are used by speakers to communicate various intentions.

**A Rebuttal to the 'Principle of Compositionality'

Is the principle of compositionality empirically true? In opposition to the principle of compositionality, it is evident that persons learn their sentence use, grammar, and semantic rules informally. When learning a natural language (by immersion) the meaning of a sentence (a complex structure) is understood without conscious attention to the individual words and syntactic conventions that give sentences their structure. As a child, sentence use (and meaning) follows immediately from hearing and imitating adults and others. For a child, sentence meaningfulness comes first, and then comes the (optional) learning of the formal rules of the compositional grammar. The rules of syntax and semantics (including formal semantics) may allow explanations (and models) of how new and novel sentences are constructed, but there is no evidence that these compositional rules are the reason for (or result in) 'meaningful sentences.' Contrary to compositionality, the meaning of a complex expression (e.g. a sentence) for a person is determined by its content, the pragmatics of a situation, and the person's background beliefs.

**The Problem of Inconsistent Ethical Assertions and Negation

Another problem for non-cognitivism according to Schroeder, is that non-cognitive theories have no explanation for moral propositions and their negation. Schroeder says, "the main semantic property of 'not' is that 'p' and 'not-p' are inconsistent sentences. And 'inconsistent' is usually defined in terms of truth; two sentences are inconsistent if they are guaranteed not to both be true" (p. 152). Non-cognitivists need to construct compositional
recipes to explain how contradictory sentences 'x is wrong,' and 'x is not wrong' can be asserted in a single context.

In response, the prescriptivist maintains that the speaker meaning of a negated linguistic expression is not determined (or explained) by its syntax and the semantic referents of the sentence parts, but instead by simply understanding that 'not' is to 'make negative' a given proposition. The so-called contradictory moral assertions that 'same-sex marriage is wrong' and 'same-sex marriage is not wrong' are not inconsistent when stated by different persons (as different propositions). These conflicting moral positions are consistent with different persons having different beliefs and values. If a person isn't being self-inconsistent (e.g. simultaneously accepting p and not-p), there is no problem of meaning with respect to 'not.' Explaining how 'not' functions when compositionally applied to sentences in a (non-contradictory) truth-theoretic semantics irrelevant to a speaker's meaning. The meaning of moral propositions needn't be explained in terms of the compositional and logical consistency of sentences in a model.

Part VII. The Frege-Geach Problem

Schroeder pays great attention to the Frege-Geach problem. Peter Geach (1965) alleges that there is a problem in understanding how prescriptive premises (having no truth conditions) can function to produce valid moral arguments. Geach's primary problem with non-cognitive theories is that they do not specify any truth-conditions for a moral assertion. This allegedly presents a problem of equivocation when evaluating deductive arguments. Geach, in effect, asks how can a 'prescription' carry consistent semantic contents (i.e. the same meaning) across both asserted and non-asserted contexts and where contexts differ. We will review two problems of possible equivocation in ethical deductive arguments.
Problem #1: The Indeterminate Value of the Antecedent in Premise 2

This example is from Geach (1965, p. 463):

1) Tormenting the cat is bad.

2) If tormenting the cat is bad, getting your little brother to do it is bad.

Thus: 3) Getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad.

Adjusting Geach's problem to prescriptivism, it is alleged that 'tormenting the cat' in the first premise is asserted as a prescription; but in the second premise, 'tormenting the cat' isn't being asserted (as a prescription or otherwise). And if 'tormenting the cat' in the antecedent of the second premise isn't asserted (and has an undetermined acceptance or non-acceptance value), then we are representing 'tormenting the cat is bad' in the second premise with potentially two different acceptance-values, and the above argument is invalid on the pain of equivocation.

Our response to this problem is that we should just charitably assume that the second premise has the form 'if prescription, then prescription,' and that the antecedent of the conditional (in the second premise) and the first premise have the same-acceptance value (i.e. affirming the positive value of cats and their well-being) and that the moral conclusion is prescriptive:

1) (It is prescribed that) Tormenting the cat is bad.

2) If (it is prescribed that) tormenting the cat is bad, then (it is prescribed that) getting your little brother to do it is bad.

Thus: 3) (It is prescribed that) Getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad.

In this argument, we would reasonably assume that anyone who asserts the first premise as a prescription would also assert that 'tormenting the cat' in the antecedent of the second premise as having the same prescriptive value as the first premise, as a matter of consistency. The meaning
of 'Tormenting the cat is wrong' remains constant with the same value-attitude. As long as the prescriptivist who advances this argument maintains that there is no literal truth value to the first premise, the entire second premise, and the conclusion, then there is no equivocation in meaning.

**Problem #2: The Indeterminate Value of the Consequent in Premise 2**

Another problem is illustrated with the following similar moral argument:

1) Feeding the wolves is bad.

2) If feeding the wolves is bad, getting your little brother to do it is bad.

Thus: 3) Getting your little brother to feed the wolves is bad.

In a context, it could be the case that feeding wolves (e.g. in a residential neighborhood) is bad because of ills associated with the congregation of wild wolves among humans. In this situation, the alleged entailment to a moral conclusion might be thought to be invalid because even if premise 1 and the antecedent in premise 2 are consistently adopted (as assumed-true or prescribed), this leaves open as indeterminate the consequent about whether you should get your little brother to do something that is bad. Since the consequent is a separate undetermined value judgment, this leaves the entire conditional in premise 2 with an undetermined truth/adoption value, and the argument isn't valid.

The solution to this problem is to make explicit an implicit suppressed third premise:

1) (It is prescribed that) Feeding the wolves is bad.\(^{12}\)

2) If (it is prescribed that) feeding the wolves is bad, then (it is prescribed that) getting your little brother to do it is bad.

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\(^{12}\) As an aside, in other contexts, such as at a public zoo, where food is provided, it could be that it is permissible (or *good*) to feed the wolves. Premise 1 cannot be evaluated out of context.
3) (It is prescribed that) Getting your little brother to do bad things is bad.

4) Thus (It is prescribed that) Getting your little brother to feed the wolves is bad.

To repeat from above: With a moral argument, the best we can do is to present a valid argument, where it is assumed (as a fiction) that the value and ethical premises have a truth value, and that the validity of the argument is determined by the rules of deductive logic. The assumption that ethical values and principles are 'true or false' is false, but there is no harm in assessing the validity of moral arguments, if it is understood that the value premises don't literally have a truth value. When using prescriptions, there is no equivocation in a speaker's meaning and intent.

**Part VIII. Prescriptivism Compared to Expressivism**

Expressivism is a family of theories that characterizes ethical assertions as expressing non-belief-like (i.e. non-cognitive) mental states. Persons have moral attitudes that express 'approval' or 'disapproval' of an action (or value, policy). Moral words and sentences are said to express or be 'about' the emotions, feelings, goals, norm-acceptance of a speaker. To assert that 'abortion is wrong' (or e.g. 'cheating on a test is wrong') is to assert one's attitude (or state of mind) about something that isn't a fact. There are no ethical facts. An ethical assertion doesn't express a true (or false) proposition \( p \). This compares to nonmoral (descriptive) assertions where \( S \) has a cognitive propositional 'attitude' towards 'global warming is occurring' or 'snow is white'.

The prescriptivist response is to critically deny the expressivist's principal thesis that moral assertions function to express mental states as non-cognitive attitudes. Descriptive assertions (i.e. representational) and prescriptive assertions (i.e. non-representational) are not about 'attitudes' or 'mental states' towards a proposition. Instead, moral assertions function to express prescriptions. In claiming moral assertions should be understood as prescriptions, the
prescriptivist identifies the 'non-cognitive attitudes' or 'mental states' of the expressivist as identical to 'personal values' manifested in sentient creatures. Similarly, 'cognitive attitudes' are beliefs. Moreover, the prescriptivist doesn't posit the semantic thesis that moral words (e.g. 'wrong,' 'good') have a different kind of meaning than non-moral words. Instead attention is directed to a speaker's intent and the contextual (speaker) meaning of complete sentences.

**Conclusion**

Moral cognitivists sometimes criticize noncognitive theories because it is alleged that non-realist theories cannot explain the concept of a 'moral mistake.' It is said that a 'mistake' cannot be made unless there is a moral proposition that is true or false that one can be mistaken about. This objection is without merit. A moral mistake can be talked about without assuming moral truth. Most people in the United States think that it was a moral mistake to deny civil rights to persons of color into the 1960s. A newly converted vegetarian might think that it was a personal mistake to have been once consuming meat. We can also admit to making 'moral mistakes' on a personal level when acting out of anger, greed, lust, selfishness, and a like, or from being unaware of non-moral situational facts, or not having knowledge of other persons' expectations or values; all without believing in an independent moral reality.

The distinction between descriptions and prescriptions helps provide a positive characterization of how morality and moral language works. A prescriptivist's moral talk remains similar to that of a moral cognitivist, but without making any claim of moral knowledge. That values are relative to the existence of persons doesn't imply that what is morally right is relative to cultural convention, or that opposing assertions are 'equally correct.' Prescriptivists can talk about what is 'right and wrong' and 'good and bad' conduct (e.g. about drunk driving, abortion)
without pretense of something that 'lies beyond' the values that we endorse. Despite the fact that there are no ethical truths, this doesn't preclude us from making reasoned (and formally valid, but not sound) ethical arguments.

Finally, I maintain that there more examples of plausible 'prescriptions': 1) stipulative definitions, 2) 'sufficient evidence' assertions in regresses 3) the axioms, vocabulary, syntax rules, and inference rules of formal systems, and 4) standard metaphysical axioms (e.g. identity, bivalence). With elaboration, the descriptive-prescriptive distinction has radical implications for philosophical subdisciplines outside of ethics and the philosophy of language; including epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, aesthetics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind.

References


