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This website supports two (2) proposed monographs. Copyrighted. All Rights Reserved.
The first proposed monograph:
Back Cover Summary
The second proposed monograph: Eight Essays in Conceptual Analysis: A Companion to Descriptions, Prescriptions, and the Limits of Knowledge
ABSTRACT: This volume is a companion to the lead volume, Descriptions Prescriptions, and the Limits of Knowledge. In the past several years, the initial seven essays were submitted to leading philosophy journals for publication, but all were declined. A major reason for their rejection is that contemporary journal articles are typically required to be modest and rigorous, usually on a small topic. A reoccurring complaint about these essays was that the topics are too wide in scope (i.e., too ambitious) and lack required detailed elaboration (i.e., insufficient evidence). These essays violate the norms of what constitutes a good journal article. And further, their conclusions don't make many philosophers happy, since dominant worldviews are challenged. But nevertheless, I believe that these essays are valuable for synthesizing relationships among the chapters of the lead volume. An eighth essay “A Short History of Definition” appears here for the first time.
Essay 1: A Predominately Externalist Definition of Knowledge
ABSTRACT: Most philosophers believe that a necessary and sufficient conditions analysis of knowledge cannot be fruitful. Against this worldview, I propose a four-condition predominately externalist (PE) definition of knowledge. In addition to the traditional ‘justified true belief’ conditions, a 'relevancy condition' and a 'no-defeaters condition' are added. We will examine eight case studies and explain why S knows or doesn't know in various situations, including the parked car case, barn façade case, and two lottery cases. We'll respond to the skeptical argument and the 'safety' condition. A key feature of the PE theory is that it doesn't guarantee that knowledge exists. The skeptical hypothesis is accepted, and epistemic closure is rejected, so that the PE definition doesn't assure that S knows any p. The definition just states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Against the skeptic's impossibility conclusion, with the satisfaction of the PE conditions, knowledge is clearly possible and obtainable.Essay 2: The Methodology of Analytic Philosophy: Intuitions, Concepts, and Conceptual Analysis (32 pages). Available for review.
ABSTRACT: In this essay I defend intuitions and conceptual analysis as being crucial to a social scientific analytic linguistic philosophy. This essay recognizes a distinction between world-view intuitions and linguistic intuitions as beliefs that motivate conceptual analyses. I argue that since a theory cannot be constructed solely out of unbiased and neutral world-view intuitions, the analytic philosopher must provide a theory with hypotheses and examples that provide reasons to believe that a given worldview is true. An analytic theory mediates between 'world-view intuitions' (e.g. about theism, naturalism, possible-worlds realism) and 'linguistic intuitions' (i.e. involving the use of particular concepts and sentences). Six key kinds of concepts are postulated: (1) Natural Kind, (2) Group Resemblance, (3) Fixed Definiens, (4) Fictional Entity, (5) Definite Description, and (6) Proper Names. The intuitions of Williamson (2007), Cappelen (2012), and Deutsch (2015) about methodology are critiqued.Essay 3: A Theory of Metaethical Prescriptivism (35 pages). Available for review. ABSTRACT: The ‘prescriptivist’ metaethical theory argued here makes the claim that moral assertions are neither true nor false; and thus, they are not knowable. The name 'prescriptivism' is not associated with Hare's (1952, 1963) theory. This theory hypothesizes that ethical assertions and value affirmations are ‘prescriptions.’ ‘Descriptions’ are assertions that are literally true or false, and ‘prescriptions’ are assertions intended to be agreed-upon (but not literally true or false). The 'correctness' of any ethical assertion (or value affirmation) is dependent upon what persons accept, tolerate, or agree-to, and does not refer to an objective moral reality.Essay 4: A Tripartite Theory of 'Definition' (39 pages). Available for review. ABSTRACT: This essay analyzes the nature of 'definition' as a definiendum-to-definiens relationship. A 'tripartite theory' of definition is hypothesized. It states that whenever a person defines a definiendum- to-a-definiens, that person can only be interpreted as asserting either a 'reportive definition,' a 'theoretic definition,' or a 'stipulative definition.' In order to verify the truth of the theory, a conceptual investigation about the functional use of definitions in various situations is described by examples. Of special interest are the examples of 'stipulative definition.' As a mathematical anti-realist, I contend that formal systems are largely composed of stipulative definitions that are either 'technically formalized' or 'abbreviatory' in nature. To back up the tripartite theory, I discuss Carnap’s concept of ‘explication,’ and sketch a ‘game formalism’ account of mathematics. A theory of definition and an epistemology of mathematics is presented.Essay 5: Ambiguities in Speaker Reference (40 pages). Submitted to Asian Journal of Philosophy. ABSTRACT: In the philosophy of language there is a well-known distinction between 'semantic reference' which is a relation between a linguistic expression and an entity, and 'speaker reference' which is a relation between a speaker and an entity. While most studies pursue semantic reference, I will present a theory of 'speaker reference.' I argue that the results of case studies from Saul Kripke (1980), Keith Donnellan (1966), and Richard K. Heck (2018), are all explainable with a speaker theory. Further, I argue that 'semantic reference' doesn't really exist unless it is stipulated by a formal model. Consequentially, laypersons cannot have linguistic intuitions about semantic reference. In contrast, almost everyone has linguistic intuitions about speaker reference, as is discussed. It is concluded that ‘linguistic reference’ is found in artificial languages, but not in natural language, and that any ambiguities in reference are those of speaker reference.Essay 6: What are Propositions? Do We Have 'Attitudes' Toward Them? (23 pages). Available for review. ABSTRACT: Propositions are thought to differ from sentences in the following ways: (1) Propositions are declarative sentences that in context present the 'content' of S's thought. (2) A proposition is metaphorically 'what is said' by a declarative sentence. (3) Different sentences in context can mean 'the same thing' or have 'the same meaning'; i.e., different sentences can express the same proposition (relative to context). (4) Propositions (as descriptive assertions) are true or false in context. These four intuitions seem satisfactory. In addition to these, it is also thought that: (5) A proposition is essentially true or false and (6) Persons have ‘attitudes’ towards propositions. I argue that the last two intuitions are false. I argue that (1) speakers can assert propositions that are ‘truth-apt’ or ‘non-truth-apt’ and (2) persons don't have an 'attitude' relationship to propositions. This essay will explore our linguistic intuitions (and stipulate a definition) for the term 'proposition.'Essay 7: Case Study Questions for Experimental Philosophers: What is 'Art?' (20 pages). Available for review. ABSTRACT: Experimental philosophers have criticized ‘the method of cases’ on grounds that the verdicts of various case studies when presented to laypersons, have led to diverse answers. These verdicts are sometimes based upon irrelevant factors such as cultural background, order of case presentation, affective content, and heritable personality traits. The ‘expertise’ of philosophers’ intuitions is questioned. In this essay I defend expert intuitions and the method of cases as crucial to answering questions related to aesthetics. I introduce a ‘hybrid’ definition of ‘art’ and suggest eight case studies (with questions) to experimental philosophers; and invite them to survey willing participants. At a future time, we can compare participant answers with theory answers. While I’m interested in any statistical results, I maintain that any divergence from the ‘correct’ answers that I propose isn’t evidence of a failure of the hybrid definition or of the method of cases. Instead, with any divergence in opinion, it is the task of the theorist to explain to survey participants why an alternative answer is preferable. To reiterate, this essay defends the methodology of conceptual analysis, and introduces a tentative definition of ‘art.’Essay 8: Appendix: A Short History of 'Definition' (25 pages). Available for review. ABSTRACT: A short history of 'definition' in recent philosophy is presented. The views presented here are in approximate chronological historical order and revolve around discussion of 'real' and 'nominal' definitions. Under the tripartite theory, a 'real' definition is approximately identified as a 'theoretic' definition. A 'nominal' definition is understood to be identified as 'reportive' or 'stipulative.' The conclusion of this history is that the quoted texts support the idea that mathematical definitions are typically (3b) stipulative abbreviations or (3c) stipulative formalizations of fixed definiens concepts. Other redundant essays:
In Defense of the Method of Cases
ABSTRACT: In this essay I argue that intuitions and ‘the method of cases’ are crucial to informative conceptual analyses in analytic philosophy. I argue that ‘case studies,’ in the form of thought experiments, play a decisive role in evaluating a philosophical theory. In contrast, experimental philosophers have objected to the method of cases, on grounds that the verdicts of various case studies when presented to laypersons, lead to diverse verdicts. These verdicts are sometimes based upon irrelevant factors such as cultural background, order of case presentation, affective content, and heritable personality traits. In “Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases” (2021) Horvath and Koch present the current status of the experimental challenge. These authors conclude that arguments and empirical evidence supporting the ‘method of cases’ and the ‘expertise defense’ are unconvincing. They state that the burden of proof still lies upon philosophers supporting the method of cases. I respond to this challenge with the use of intuitions, conceptual analysis, and definitions, to defend the method of cases with an ‘expertise defense’ as the proper methodology for a social scientific analytic philosophy.What is a Prescription? What is a Proposition? (23 pages). Available for review. ABSTRACT: The word 'prescription' is used in natural language and analytic philosophy but no precise definition for this term has been established. Here I advance a theoretical definition of a descriptive-prescriptive assertion distinction. In order to understand how descriptions and prescriptions function, a summary sketch of their ordinary use is presented. There are four important kinds of 'prescriptions': (1) regress-ending 'sufficient evidence' claims, (2) stipulative definitions, (3) the axioms, vocabulary, syntax, and inference rules of deductive systems, and (4) normative ethical assertions. Six kinds of 'descriptions' are explained: (1) empirical assertions, (2) deductive entailments, (3) reportive (lexical) definitions, (4) theoretic (natural kind) definitions, (5) aesthetic assertions, and (6) social science theories. A definition of 'proposition' is formulated using intuitions from twenty case examples. Soames (2010) claim that "for a sentence to be meaningful is for it to represent the world as being a certain way" (p. 1) is shown false. |
| What Is Knowledge? Chapter One is devoted to the philosophical problem of finding a definition for the term ‘knowledge.’ | |||||
Until the appearance of a short journal article written by Professor Edmund Gettier in 1963 it was taken for granted among philosophers that 'knowledge' is definable as ‘justified true belief.’ In other words, for a person S (subject) to know p (a proposition, assertion) the person needs to believe p, p has to be true, and S needs to be justified (i.e. have strong reasons) for believing p. This 'traditional definition of knowledge' can be stated as: 'Knowledge' = 'justified true belief.' With counter-examples presented by Gettier (1963) and Gilbert Harman (1973) it was shown that this traditional definition cannot be correct. Below, I present two illustrations of the kinds of counter-examples provided by Gettier and Harman. These examples show that 'knowledge' cannot be simply defined as 'justified true belief.' My goal is to suggest an alternative definition of knowledge that responds to the counter-examples below and provides a consistent world-view about the possibility of knowledge. |
Counter-example #1: Professor Brown Returns to a Classroom– | |||||
The following example illustrates a Gettier counter-example.
The story: Professor S is a philosophy professor at a major university.
He works in the department with his close friend and colleague, Professor Brown.
S believes that Professor B will be reading and lecturing on his
recently completed journal essay
at a meeting of ten graduate students and a visiting professor at 4PM on Friday afternoon in
Room 222. This is a major presentation and Professor Brown is excited about the scheduled paper
reading. There are numerous posters in the hallway advertising the event, and all ten graduate
students have mentioned to Professor S their enthusiasm to attend. At 10AM on
the same Friday morning S sees B, and B is prepared
and eager to present his paper. S knows that B is dedicated, reliable,
enthusiastic, and punctual. Because of prior commitments, Professor S cannot
attend B’s reading, but S strongly believes (upon strong evidence)
that ‘B will be in Room 222 at 4PM on Friday.’ However at 11AM, the anticipated meeting begins to fall apart. Several graduate students have extenuating circumstances and cannot attend the presentation. The visiting professor also phones B and because of a plane delay at the airport, cannot attend. These parties communicate this to B by phone or e-mail by 1PM on Friday. At this time, B begins to feel ill with a sore throat, and at 1:15PM he decides to cancel the presentation and phones the remaining graduate students with the promise to reschedule the paper reading in the future. Professor B lives near campus, and it is a 15 minute walk to campus. At 3:45PM on that Friday, B remembers that he left his reading glasses and a book in Room 222 on campus. He walks to campus, and happens to be in Room 222 at 4PM. At this same time, Professor S thinks about his colleague, Brown, and says to himself, I know that ‘B is now in Room 222.’ The question: As a matter of fact, it is true that B is in Room 222, S believes that B is in Room 222, and S has strong evidence and is justified in believing that B is in Room 222. (All three conditions of the traditional definition of knowledge are satisfied). But, in this situation, does S really ‘know’ that B is in Room 222 at 4PM? The reply: Professor S does not know that ‘B is Room 222 at 4PM.’ Having knowledge is typically thought to be stronger than just having a lucky, coincidental true belief. To know p it is usually thought that a person should have the right reasons (or a true account) for why one believes p. S’s true belief that B is in room 222 is a matter of luck (or coincidence). The problem: This is a clear counter-example to the traditional definition of knowledge. In this case, S possesses a belief p and has a strong justification (i.e. strong evidence, strong reasons) for believing p, and p is true, but S does not know p. Knowledge cannot be defined as ‘justified true belief’ since this is a case where S has a justified true belief that p, but S doesn’t know p. |
Counter-example #2: The Henry and the Barn Case– | |||||
The following example proposed by Carl Ginet and popularized by Alvin Goldman (1976) best illustrates a Harman problem. The story: Let us imagine Henry and his young son are traveling in a car in a rural setting. There are all kinds of normal things that Henry sees; trees, cows, barns, birds, and so on. Henry points out all of these things to his young son, in order to help him with his vocabulary. But unknown to Henry, he has migrated into a rural area where many cleverly constructed barn facades have been built to accommodate a nearby Hollywood film crew. These ‘barn facades’ are not really barns, but are carefully constructed plywood props. Let us suppose that in this situation that there are (in fact) 99 barn facades in the area, and only one real barn that is sturdy and functional for normal use. Let us further suppose that Henry is now traveling in front of the one real barn and states ‘There is a barn.’ The question: Does Henry know that he is seeing a barn? In this case, Henry has a true belief because Henry is actually seeing a barn, and Henry has strong evidence and justification (i.e. Henry is in a rural setting, Henry is viewing what looks like a barn, Henry’s perceptual faculties are working normally, etc.). In sum, Henry believes that he is seeing a barn, it is true that Henry is seeing a barn, and the existence of a real barn is why Henry believes he is seeing a barn. (All three conditions of the traditional definition of knowledge are satisfied). But, in this situation, does Henry really ‘know’ that ‘I am seeing a barn?’
The reply: As almost everyone would agree, the mere fact that Henry has a genuine true belief based upon truth-connecting and pertinent evidence (e.g. being in a rural setting, viewing an apparent barn, etc.) is not sufficient for Henry to know that ‘I am now seeing a barn.’ The reason why we deny Henry’s having knowledge in this situation, is because of the existence of undermining evidence that Henry is unaware of in this material situation. If Henry was aware that the other 99 objects are barn facades, Henry would acknowledge that he could not distinguish a real barn from a barn facade, and Henry would concede that his belief that he was now seeing a barn had weakened considerably, so that he would not know whether he was seeing a barn. In this example (with the existence of 99 nearby barn facades) Henry does not know that he is seeing a barn. The problem: This is a clear counter-example to the traditional definition of knowledge. In this case, S possesses a belief p and has a strong justification (i.e. strong evidence, strong reasons) for believing p, and p is true, but S does not know p. Knowledge cannot be defined as ‘justified true belief’ since this is a case where S has a justified true belief that p, but S doesn’t know p. |
The Problem Resolved: A New Definition of Knowledge-- | |||||
‘S knows p’ if and only if:
Condition 3 assumes that the acquisition of knowledge is a natural process, and that a 'belief' is a functional mental state involving an attitude of affirming, doubting, denying, or suspending judgment about a propositional assertion. Condition 3 requires that S's true belief must be the result of evidence that is relevant for why p should be believed true. In other words, the implicit or explicit reasons for S's belief that p must be the grounds (i.e. a truth-connection) for why p should be believed true. Whether condition 3 is satisfied is either true or false, and is conceived to be an externalist condition. Condition 4 is a conjunction of internalist and externalist conditions. Condition 4a is normative and prescriptive, and its content is identical to the 'justification condition' in the traditional definition of knowledge. Condition 4b is a 'no defeaters' condition. If there exists unconsidered counter-evidence q such that this undermining counter-evidence would lead S to doubt p, then S does not know p. The above definition eliminates the term 'justification' and correctly explains why Professor S does not know that ‘B is in room 222' and why Henry does not know that ‘I see a barn.’ In the first case, Professor S does not know p because conditions 3 and 4b are violated. In the second case, Henry does not know p because condition 4b is violated. In chapter one of Descriptions, Prescriptions and the Limits of Knowledge , I argue that this definition provides a basis for judging in any material situation whether (or not) it is true that ‘S knows p.’ While these four conditions are intended to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, because 4a is normative, they are not precise enough to judge every instance of potential knowing as an unequivocal instance of knowledge. But with the examination of numerous example cases, it is shown that these four conditions are the core basis for judging whether S knows p.
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